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Abstract:  
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cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions 
target. We show that the monopolist could take 
advantage of the constraint on borrowing by 
distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across 
periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is 
influenced by the way permits are initially allocated 
between agents. A cost-effective distribution of 
abatement across periods can be achieved by an 
appropriate distribution of the total endowments of 
permits over time for each agent. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting the borrowing of 
emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the 
consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emission target. Hence, 
we are asking whether the constraint on borrowing makes it possible for the dominant agent 
to increase its profit by distributing sales cost-ineffectively across periods. Further, we discuss 
how the initial allocation of emission permits influences this possibility.  
Several intertemporal trading mechanisms prohibit borrowing because it provides no 
guarantee that the emissions borrowed will be abated in the future. Firms may shut down in 
future periods such that their borrowed emissions are not abated. Further, with international 
agreements one also faces the danger of changed policies towards a participation in 
international agreements, which might lead to that a country withdraws from an agreement 
and hence that their borrowed emissions are not paid back. In the United States, only banking 
of tradable sulfur dioxide permits is allowed. (EPA 2003). Further, California’s Low-
Emission Vehicle Program allows manufacturers of passenger cars only to bank, not borrow, 
hydrocarbon emissions (California Air Resource Board 2003). At the international level, the 
Kyoto Protocol allows banking of emission permits between periods, but not borrowing.  
Equity issues or political conditions will often play a role in allocating permits among 
various agents in an emission trading system. These considerations could result in a 
distribution of permits that gives some firms or countries an opportunity to exercise market 
power in the emission permits market.1 For instance, under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia is 
allocated a large amount of permits for the period from 2008 to 2012, and it is expected to be 
large seller of permits (see e.g. Weyant and Hill 1999).2   
Hagem and Westskog (1998) look at the linkage between intertemporal emissions trading 
and exercising of market power in the emissions permit market. They show that with full 
intertemporal trading, costs will be minimized across periods, even if there is an agent that 
exercises market power in the emissions permit market. However, inefficiencies across agents 
will occur because of the exercising of market power. This paper focuses on another 
important element of the linkage between intertemporal trading and exercising of market 
power, namely how restrictions on intertemporal trading affect the inefficiencies caused by a 
dominant agent. We argue that prohibiting borrowing combined with agents that exercise 
market power has consequences for the market outcome, the effectiveness of the system, and 
how emissions permits should be allocated across periods for each agent to reduce the 
inefficiencies caused by the dominant agent.    
Introducing a constraint on borrowing allows a dominant agent to manipulate the price 
difference across periods. From the literature of third-degree price discrimination, we know 
that the monopolist can profit from price discrimination when the markets can be separated 
1 Hahn (1984) shows that the opportunities for an agent to exercise market power could be undermined 
(i.e. the cost-effective outcome is achieved) by an appropriate distribution of permits between agents. 
However, this result depends on there being no other considerations that influence the decision of how 
permits should be allocated. Equity or political considerations play no role. Our paper is written under 
the assumption that a regulator must take equity considerations or political issues into account when 
deciding how permits should be allocated between agents, and hence that this could result in a 
distribution of permits where some dominant agents exercise market power.  
2 The presence of market power in a permit market has been widely discussed and analyzed in 
connection with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Westskog (1996) and Böhringer and 
Löschel (2003) analyze a situation where market power is exercised on the supply side of the permit 
market.  
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(see for instance Varian 2003). However, our problem differs somewhat from this literature. 
A constraint on borrowing allows only one-way price discrimination, which implies that the 
present value price of permits could decrease over time in equilibrium, but not the other way 
around due to the possibility for arbitrage. The literature on third degree price discrimination 
generally assumes complete separation between the markets. Further, in our problem the costs 
of abatement – i.e. the costs of producing permits for sale for the monopolist – could differ 
between periods due to the constraint on borrowing. The standard assumption in the literature 
of third degree price discrimination is that the costs of producing goods for each market are 
identical. Hence, in this paper we deviate from the traditional assumptions within the analyses 
of third degree price discrimination by analyzing a problem with one-way price 
discrimination and potentially different costs of producing permits between markets (i.e. 
periods). The paper is organized as follows: First, section 2 investigates whether the 
constraint on borrowing induces the dominant agent to increase its profit by distributing its 
total sale of permits cost-ineffectively across periods. Second, section 3 analyzes how the 
initial intertemporal distribution of permits for each agent influences the possibility of a 
dominant agent to exercise market power under a constraint on borrowing. Further, we 
consider a special case in section 4, with a competitive market in future periods and a 
dominant agent in the first. Finally, section 5 discusses how the constraint on borrowing 
affects the total sale of quotas from the dominant agent.     
In this paper, we show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on 
borrowing by distributing sales of permits ineffectively across periods. This could be the case 
with both a decreasing present value price of permits over time and when the present value 
price is constant. Hence, observing a constant present value price of permits over time, does 
not necessarily imply a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods. Further, this 
inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are distributed across periods for each agent. 
We show that the regulator can ensure a cost-effective distribution of abatement across 
periods by an appropriate distribution of each agent’s total endowment of permits over time.  
2 The model  
To show the key idea of our paper, it is sufficient to use a two-period model (the present 
period and the future period) for a tradable permit system. There is one dominant agent in the 
permit market. We will in the following assume that this agent is a large seller of permits, and 
is hereafter referred to as the monopolist, and denoted M.3 All other agents are such small 
buyers or sellers that they are considered to be price takers. These are referred to as the fringe 
and denoted F. The fringe is in total net buyers of permits.   
The agents are initially allocated an endowment of permits for each period , where i 
denotes the period (i = 1,2) and j denotes the agents (j=F,M). The agents can freely trade 
permits with each other within each period. We compare two different intertemporal trading 
regimes - one where the agents can freely bank and borrow permits across periods, and one 
where the agents are allowed to bank permits, but not borrow. We refer to the first as the “full 
intertemporal trading regime” and the latter as the “restricted intertemporal trading regime.” 
0
ijQ
 
3 The general conclusions of the paper are not affected whether we have a monopolist or a 
monopsonist. 
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)
Under both systems, the agents are obliged to ensure that their total emissions across both 
periods do not exceed the sum of held permits over both periods. The sum of held permits is 
the amount of quotas allocated in both periods plus/minus the quotas they buy/sell. Hence, the 
total emission constraint for the fringe and monopolist are given by, respectively  
0 0
1 2 1 2 1F F F Fe e Q Q q q+ = + + +      (1) 
0 0
1 2 1 2 1 2(M M M Me e Q Q q q+ = + − +      (2) 
Where  is emissions in period i by agent j, and  is sale the amount of bought in period i. ije iq
Under the restricted intertemporal trading regime, the agents are not allowed to borrow 
permits, which means that their emissions in period 1 cannot exceed the number of permits 
they hold in that period. The non-borrowing constraints are given by 
0
1 1 1 0F FQ q e+ − ≥         (3) 
0
1 1 1 0M MQ q e− − ≥         (4) 
There are no restrictions on banking, so excess permits from period 1 can be transferred to 
period 2.  
 Let  define the abatement cost function for agent j in period i( )ij ijC e
4. We assume that 
 are twice continuously differentiable. The marginal abatement costs, (( )ij ijC e
( )ij ij
ij
C e
e
∂− ∂ ), 
are positive and strictly increasing, that is (
( )
0ij ij
ij
C e
e
∂ <∂  and 
2
2
( )
0ij ij
ij
C e
e
∂ >∂ ). We assume 
that the agents have perfect information about each other’s cost functions, and perfect 
foresight about future permit prices.  
2.1 Conditions for cost-effectiveness 
Given no constraints on banking or borrowing – i.e., a constraint only on total emissions – a 
cost-minimizing allocation of abatement between agents and across periods is achieved when 
the present value of marginal abatement costs between agents and across periods is equalized 
(see e.g. Tietenberg (1985)). With a restriction on borrowing, cost-effectiveness would still 
mean that marginal abatement costs across agents should be equalized. However, there is a 
shadow cost that follows from the non-borrowing constraint. A positive shadow cost implies 
that there is a difference in marginal abatement costs across periods. With a constraint on 
borrowing, a necessary condition for cost-effectiveness , is that the difference in marginal 
abatement costs is equalized across periods for each agent (See Rubin (1996)).  This implies 
that the positive shadow cost following from the non-borrowing constraint is equal for all 
                                                     
4 Note that emissions for agent j in period i ( ) are equal to the business as usual emissions that the 
agent has in period i minus the abatement the agent carries out during the same period ( ). This 
implies that  the marginal abatement costs for agent j in period i, i.e. 
ije
ija
( )ij ij
ij
C a
a
∂
∂  ,  is equal to 
( )ij ij
ij
C e
e
∂− ∂ .  
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agents. We see this by minimizing the total cost for agents with respect to their emissions in 
each period, given their emission reduction requirements and the non-borrowing constraint: 
 
[ ]
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2, , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
F F M M
F F F F M M M Me e e e
Min TC C e C e C e C eδ δ= + + +   (5) 
s.t  0 0 0 01 2 1 2 1 2 1 2F F M M F F Me e e e Q Q Q Q+ + + = + + + M      (6) 
and        (7)0 01 1 1 1 0F M F MQ Q e e+ − − ≥ 5
The solution to this problem is characterized by  
1( ) ( ) 1, 2iF F iM iM
iF iM
C e C e i
e e
∂ ∂− = −∂ ∂ =       (8) 
 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) (F F F F M M M M
F F M M
C e C e C e C e
e e e e
δ δ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − − = − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ )   (9)
6
and 
1 1 2 2
2
1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ,j j j j
j j
C e C e
j F M
e e
δ λ∂ ∂− − − = =∂ ∂     (10) 
where  
δ is the discount factor and 2λ is the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint given by: 
0 0
2 1 1 1 10 ( 0 0)F M F Mif Q Q e eλ ≥ = + − − >      (11) 
This confirms the claims above. 
Hence, cost effectiveness implies that marginal abatement costs are equalized across agents 
within each period (eq. (8)), and that the difference in marginal abatement costs across 
periods is identical for both agents (eq. (9)), and equal to the shadow cost of the non-
borrowing constraint (eq.(10)). We henceforth refer to eq. (9) as the intertemporal cost- 
effectiveness condition. In the next section we show how restrictions on borrowing may lead 
to situations where this condition will not be satisfied.         
2.2 Prohibiting borrowing  
In this section we examine whether prohibiting borrowing may induce the monopolist to 
manipulate with the difference in permit prices over time to its own advantage. With full 
intertemporal trading, Hagem and Westskog (1998) showed that although monopoly implies 
cost-ineffectiveness between agents within each period, cost-effectiveness across periods will 
be achieved. With full intertemporal trading the present value price of quotas will be 
equalized across periods even with monopoly. If not, there would be room for intertemporal 
arbitrage (see Hagem and Westskog op.cit. for proof). Hence, the monopolist would not be 
able to manipulate prices over periods.  
                                                     
5 Observe that restrictions  and (2) correspond to , and that  and  correspond to . (1) (6) (3) (4) (7)
6 Equation (9) follows from , and is included because we refer to this condition in the following 
analyses.  
(8)
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However, prohibiting borrowing implies a one-way separation of the permit market. The 
monopolist may take advantage of this one-way separation of the two periods. This 
establishes a price difference over time that does not lead to intertemporal cost effectiveness, 
as defined in eq. (9). We first derive the fringe’s demand functions for permits, found from 
the solution to the fringe’s optimization problem. Given this demand function we could find 
the monopolist’s choice of permit sale over time.     
2.2.1 The fringe’s optimizing problem 
The optimizing problem for the fringe is given by:  
[ ]
1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
, , ,
max ( ) ( )  
F F F F
F F F F
q q e e
p q C e p q C eF δ− ⋅ − − ⋅ +Π =   (12) 
subject to the total emission constraint, given by (1), and the non-borrowing constraint, given 
by (3), where pi denotes the permit price in period i, and δ is the discount factor. 
The first order conditions for the optimization problem are given by: 
1 1
1
1
( )F F
F
C ep
e
∂= − ∂         (13) 
2 2
2
2
( )F F
F
C ep
e
∂= − ∂        (14) 
and  
1 2 Fp pδ λ= +         (15) 
0
1 1 10 ( 0 0)F F Fif Q q eλ ≥ = + − >F       (16) 
Where λF is the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint. 
Let and  denote the solution to (13) and (14). *1Fe
*
2Fe
Consider first a situation where the constraint on borrowing is non-binding for the fringe in 
equilibrium. In this situation Fλ  is equal to zero, and we see that in this case, the present value 
price of permits would be equal across periods. The equilibrium conditions for the case where 
the non-borrowing constraint is non-binding correspond to a situation with full intertemporal 
trading. With full intertemporal trading, the present value price of permits is equalized across 
periods in equilibrium. In this situation the permit price is a function of the total amount of 
permits bought over both periods (Hagem and Westskog op.cit.). Thus, Fλ =0, leads to the 
following; 
1 2 1 2( ) Fp p p q q for 0δ λ= = + = (17) 
     
However, if the non-borrowing constraint is binding, the present value price of permits 
would be non-increasing over time; 1 2p pδ≥ . This implies that (3) is satisfied with equality. 
It then follows from (1), that the fringe faces a per-period emissions constraint given by: 
         (18) 01 1 1 0F F FQ q e+ − =
0
2 2 2 0F F FQ q e+ − =         (19) 
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When the non-borrowing constraint is binding, we see from (13), (14), (18) and (19) that 
the price of permits in each period is a function of permit sale in that period (since and 
are functions of and  respectively):  
*
1Fe
*
2Fe 1Fq 2Fq
1 1 1( )p p q=        (20) 
2 2 2( )p p q=        (21) 
It follows from our assumptions about the abatement cost functions that the prices decrease 
as the quantity sold increases:  
2
1 1
* 2
1 1
0.
( )
F
F
p C
q e
∂ ∂= − <∂ ∂      (22) 
2
2 2
* 2
2 2
0.
( )
F
F
p C
q e
∂ ∂= − <∂ ∂        (23)
 7
 
2.2.2 The monopolist’s optimizing problem 
When there is a constraint on borrowing, the monopolist’s problem is no longer only to 
choose its optimal number of permits sold over both periods, but also the distribution of sales 
across periods. As discussed above, this may lead to both cost-ineffectiveness across agents 
(eq. (8) is violated) and cost-ineffectiveness across periods (eq. (9) is violated). To focus on 
the non-borrowing constraint’s impact on intertemporal cost-effectiveness when there is a 
monopolist in the permit market, we derive the monopolist distribution of permit sales for a 
given total sale of permits. The effects of reduced or increased total sales of permits are hence 
not included. These effects would be important to incorporate in the discussion of the effects 
on total costs of the constraint compared to a situation with full intertemporal trading. We 
discuss this in section 5. 
Let Q  (= ) denote the given total sale of permits over both periods. Whether the 
non-borrowing constraint becomes binding for the fringe can be determined by the 
monopolist’s distribution of total permit sales across periods. For any given total sale of 
permits, the monopolist can make the non-borrowing constraint binding by selling sufficiently 
few of the permits in period 1 (unless the non-borrowing constraint is not binding even for 
). A binding constraint for the fringe implies that the monopolist can get a higher 
present value price for the permits in period 1 than in period 2. However, because banking is 
permitted, the monopolist cannot force the present value price in period 2 above the price in 
period 1 by selling sufficiently many permits in period 1.   
1q q+ 2
1 0q =
Let 1 1 ( )F Fq q Q=% % denote the maximum number of permits sold by the monopolist in period 
1, which makes the non-borrowing constraint binding for the fringe. Hence, for , 
the non-borrowing constraint is not binding for the fringe, that is 
1 1F Fq q> %
0Fλ =  for  (and 
then the present value price of permits is a function of the total permit sales; 
%
1 1Fq q>
1 2 1( 2 )p p p q q= ∂ = + , and will be identical across periods). On the other hand, if , 
the fringe faces a binding non-borrowing constraint, and the price functions are given by 
1 1F Fq q≤ %
                                                     
*
1
1
1
e
F
q
∂
=
∂
 and  
*
2
2
1F
e
q
∂ =∂ . 
7 From equations (  and  we have: 18) (19)
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1 1 1 2 2 2( ) and ( )p p q p p q= = . In this case we see from the characteristics of the price 
functions ((22)- (23)) that the present value price of permits would decrease over time, i.e. 
1 2p pδ>  and 0Fλ >  for .When 1 1Fq q< % F 1F1Fq q= % , the present value price of permits 
would be identical across periods, i.e. 1 1 2 2( ) ( )p q p qδ=  and 0Fλ = .  
In order to derive the monopolist’s distribution of permit sale over time it can be useful to 
divide the monopolist profit maximizing problem in two steps. The monopolist’s optimizing 
problem is to find the optimal distribution of emission over time, in addition to the optimal 
distribution of permit sale over time. In the following we first derive conditions for the 
distribution of emission over time, and show that the optimal distribution of emissions over 
time is a function of the distribution of permit sale over time. Hence, we can express the 
monopolists’ profit as a function of the distribution of permit sale only (given that emission is 
optimally distributed across periods).  
Optimal distribution of emissions over time implies that the total abatement cost is 
minimized. This leads to the following optimizing problem  
[ ]
1 2
1 1 2 21 2
,
min ( ) ( )( , )
M M
M M M MM M M
e e
C e C eTC e e δ+=      (24) 
s.t. 
0
1 1 1 0M M Mq e Q+ − ≤         (25) 
0 0
1 2 1 2M M M Me e Q Q+ = + −Q        (26) 
 
This leads to the following first-order conditions 
 
1 2
1 2
( )M M M
M M
C C
e e
δ λ∂ ∂− − − ⋅ − =∂ ∂ 0       (27) 
0
1 1 10 ( 0 )M M Mif q e Qλ ≥ = + <       (28) 
 
We see from (27) and (28) that the difference in the present value of the marginal abatement 
costs over time equals the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint. Whether the non-
borrowing constraint becomes binding depends on the distribution of permit sale across 
periods. If the non-borrowing constraint is binding for the monopolist, the monopolist’s 
emissions in each period are functions of the first-period sale ( ). 1q
Let and  denote the solution to (27) and (28). Furthermore, let *1 1( )Me q
*
2 1( )Me q
1 1 ( )M Mq q Q=% % denote the maximum number of permits the monopolist can sell without facing 
a binding non-borrowing constraint.  This implies that, 0Mλ =  for %1 1Mq q≤ , and hence that 
1 2
* *
1 2
M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− = − ⋅∂ ∂ , for  
%
1 1Mq q≤ .  
 
The monopolist profit maximizing distribution of a given total permit sale over time, (Q ), 
can now be found by  
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1
1
* *
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1max ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))( ) M M M MM
q
p q C e q p Q q C e qq δ ⎡ ⎤⋅ − + ⋅ − −Π ⎣ ⎦=   (29) 
s.t. 
%
%
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
( )
F
F
p p q and p p q for q q
p p p Q for q qδ
= =
= = >
≤
     (30) 
 
We find the following first-order condition for an interior maximum: 
%
%
*
1 2 1 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 1* *
1 2 1 2 1
*
1 2 1
1 1* *
1 2 1
( ) 0
( ) 0
M M M
F
M M
M M M
F
M M
p p C C ep q p q for q
q q e e q
C C e
q
for q q
e e q
δ δ
δ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ = ≤⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
∂ ∂ ∂− ⋅ ⋅ = >∂ ∂ ∂
 (31)
  
 
where it follows from (27) and (28) that 
 
%
%
* *
1 2
1 1
1 2
* *
1 2
1 1
1 2
( ) 0
( ) 1
M M
M
M M
M
e e for q q
q q
e e for q q
q q
∂ ∂= − = ≤∂ ∂
∂ ∂= − = >∂ ∂
 
 
Since the price functions change for 
%
11 F
q q=  due to the non-borrowing constraint, the 
marginal profit function is discontinues for
%
11 F
q q= . This implies that the first order conditions 
can be satisfied for both larger and less than 1q
%
1F
q . Furthermore, the solution to the 
maximizing problem may also be a corner solution where there is no  which satisfies the 
first order conditions. 
1q
We find tree different solutions to the first order condition and one possible corner solution:  
 
i) The first-order condition, (31), is satisfied for  , while there is no which 
satisfies (31). In this case we have a unique interior solution. 
%
1 1Fq q≤ %1 1Fq q>
 
 ii) The first-order condition is satisfied both for a specific  and for a range of 
. 
%
1 1Fq q≤
%
1 1Fq q>
iii) The first order condition is satisfied for a range of , while there is no  
which satisfies the condition.  
iv) Neither  nor  satisfies the first-order condition. This results in a corner 
solution. 
%
1 1Fq q> %1 1Fq q≤
%
1 1Fq q≤ %1 1Fq q>
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In order to find a global maximum of the monopolist profit function we will in the 
following assume that marginal revenue from permit sale in period 1 is a decreasing function 
of permit sale for all 8%1 1Fq q≤ . This implies that the monopolist’s marginal profit function,  
1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂ , is decreasing in quantities for all , it is discontinuous for , it is 
negative or zero for  and it is kinked at 
%
1 1Fq q≤ 1 1Fq q= %
%
1 1Fq q> 1 1Mq q= % .9 To illustrate the possible 
outcomes of the monopolist’s maximization problem  we draw the different paths for the 
marginal profit function This function, denoted 1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂ , is expressed by the left hand 
side of  (31).  
Examples of different paths for the marginal profit function described by the alternatives i) 
– iv) above, are drawn in figure 1 – 4. From the figures, we see that there are three possible 
solutions to the monopolist’s profit maximizing problem: 
1. When the first order conditions are satisfied for , , we obtain a unique 
solution for the optimal , denoted . Hence, in both situation i) and ii) described 
above (and illustrated in figure 1 and 2 ), the optimal  is the permit sale which 
satisfies; 
%
1 1Fq q≤
1q
*
1q
1q
 
*
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 * *
1 2 1 2
( )M M M
M M
p p C Cp q p q
q q e e
δ δ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
1
1
0e
q
                                                     
 (32) 
 
Hence, if the first order condition (31) is satisfied for a q1 that makes the non-
borrowing constraint binding for the fringe, it is optimal for the monopolist to 
distribute the given total sale of permits such that the marginal revenue from permit 
sale in period one is equal to the marginal revenue from permit sale in period 2 minus 
the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint for the monopolist.   
8 This assumption is satisfied if the marginal abatement cost functions for the fringe are linear or 
concave (
2
2 0( )
i
i
p
q
∂ ≤∂ ). This will also be the case for convex marginal abatement cost functions 
(
2
2 0( )
i
i
p
q
∂ >∂ ) within a certain range where 
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 22 2
1 2 1 2
2 ( ) 0
( ) ( )
p p p pq q
q q q q
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ .  
9 It follows from our assumption about the marginal abatement costs that the difference in marginal 
abatement costs increases in q1, for 1 2* *
1 2
( )M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− > − ⋅∂ ∂ . 
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1q
1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂
%
1Fq
%
1Mq
*
1q
Figure 1.
 
1q
1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂
%
1Mq
%
1Fq
*
1q
Figure 2.
 
 
2. For a marginal profit function described in situation iii) (illustrated in figure 3.), there 
is a range for optimal permit sales in period 1 which is characterized by 
. % %*11 1F Mq q q< ≤
Hence, if the first order condition (31) is satisfied only for a distribution of permit 
sale where the non-borrowing constraint does not bind for any of the agents, we 
cannot specify a specific optimal q1, but we find an optimal range for q1 which gives 
the monopolist identical profits.  
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1q
1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂
%
1Mq
%
1Fq
Figure 3.
 
 
3. For profit functions described in situation iv) (illustrated in figure 4.), 
% %1 1
1 11 1
1 1
( , ) ( , )0 , 0M MF F
Q q Q q .for q q and for q q
q q
∂Π ∂Π> ≤ < >∂ ∂  The profit 
maximizing solution is then given by . %*1 1Fq q=
Hence, if there is no q1 that satisfies (31), we have a corner solution. In this case we 
find a unique optimal permit sale in period 1, , where the monopolist faces a 
binding non-borrowing constraint and sell exactly so many permits that the fringe’s 
marginal abatement costs are equalized across periods; i.e.
*
1q
1 1 2 2( ) ( )p q p qδ= . 
1q
1
1
( , )M Q q
q
∂Π
∂
%
1Fq%1Mq
Figure 4.
%*
1 1Fq q=
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By the definitions of  and %1Fq %1Mq  we see that that if %1Mq > , there is a range for the 
first period permit sales, defined by 
%
1Fq
% %
1 1M Fq q− , which makes the non-borrowing constraint 
non-binding for all agents. However, if %1Mq < , a first period permit sale that leads to a 
non-binding constraint on borrowing for the fringe cannot be achieved without a binding 
constraint on borrowing for the monopolist. Hence, the lower the target for the first period 
emissions relative to the total target for emissions, the more likely is it that the monopolist 
faces a restriction on its possibility to manipulate with the price difference between periods 
via its own non-binding constraint on borrowing; i.e. 
%
1Fq
%
1Mq < . %1Fq
The monopolist’s exploitation of a non-borrowing constraint to increase its profit can be 
seen most explicitly in the case where %1Mq > . In this situation, a cost-effective 
distribution of permit sales across periods would imply that the shadow cost of the non-
borrowing constraint would be zero for all agents, i.e. that the present value of the marginal 
abatement costs are equal across periods.
%
1Fq
10  However, we see from figure 2 that the 
monopolist may choose a distribution of sale which does not yield the cost-effective outcome 
for the distribution of permit sales across periods.  
If we have an interior solution given by (32), and the non-borrowing constraint is not 
binding for the monopolist, that is 0Mλ = , we can rewrite the first-order conditions in terms 
of elastisities and get  
1 2
1 2
11 1p pδ 1ε ε
⎡ ⎤ ⎡− = ⋅ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣
⎤⎥⎥⎦
     (33) 
 
where  
   1, 2i ii
i i
p q i
q p
ε ∂= ⋅ =∂  
is the elasticity of demand facing the monopolist in period i, evaluated at  the profit-
maximizing choices of permit sale. 
The equilibrium condition given by (33) is the well known result from the theory of third-
degree price discrimination: the market with the higher price must have the lower elasticity of 
demand; the market that is more price sensitive is charged the lower (present value) price. 
(See for instance Varian (2003)).  
There are two differences between the standard third-degree price discrimination problem 
and the problem in our study. First, due to the non-borrowing constraint in our problem, the 
present value price of permits cannot increase over time. Hence, in the case where 0Mλ = , 
the monopolist can only take advantage of the non-borrowing constraint facing the fringe if 
the elasticity of demand increases over time. Second, in the literature on third-degree price 
discrimination, the cost of producing the good is generally assumed to be independent of 
which market being served. In our case, the non-borrowing constraint may become binding 
also for the monopolist, hence making it more costly to produce the good (sell permits) in 
period 1 than in period 2. The monopolist in our case must therefore also take into account the 
                                                     
2λ  from eq.  would equal zero. 10  See eqs. (9) and . (10) (10)
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effect on its own production cost (abatement cost) when it finds the optimal distribution of 
sale over time.11  
From the discussion of the first order condition above, we can derive the following 
proposition: 
  
Proposition 1:  
If the non-borrowing constraint is binding for any of the agents in equilibrium, there is 
a cost-ineffective distribution of sales over time (except by coincidence). If the non-
borrowing constraint is not binding for any of the agents, there is a cost-effective 
distribution of sales across periods.  
 
Proof: 
If the optimal solution is characterized by (32) (, the non-borrowing constraint is binding for 
one or both of the agents see figure 1 and 2). Recall that. 1 2 1 2* *
1 2
( ( ))F F
F F
C C p p
e e
δ δ∂ ∂− − − = −∂ ∂ . 
The intertemporal efficiency condition given by (9) is hence satisfied only if (by coincidence)  
* * *1 2
1 2 2* *
1 2
M
p pq q where q Q
q q
δ∂ ∂⋅ = ⋅ = −∂ ∂
*
1q
M
2
.     (34) 
 
If the optimal solution is characterized by the third solution described above, (i.e.) 
 (see figure 4), the non-borrowing constraint is binding for the monopolist, 
but not for the fringe. In this case,
% %*
1 1 1Fq q q= >
1p pδ= , and hence, 1 2* *
1 2
( ( ))F F
F F
C C
e e
δ 0∂ ∂− − − =∂ ∂ , whereas 
1 2
* *
1 2
( ) 0M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − ⋅ >∂ ∂
*
1q
%
1M
 for .  Equation (9) is not satisfied. 
If the optimal solution is characterized by (see figure 3), the  non- borrowing 
constraint is not binding for any of the agents (
% *
11Fq q q< ≤
0F Mλ λ= = ), and we see from (13)-(15) and 
(27) that the intertemporal cost-effectiveness condition (9) is satisfied.  
           □ 
Proposition 1 tells us that introducing a non-borrowing constraint allows the monopolist to 
manipulate the price difference over time. And this may lead to an inefficient distribution of 
sales and hence emissions over time.  
Since we have a one-way separation of the market, the monopolist will not always be able 
to take advantage of the opportunity for manipulating the price difference over time. Consider 
                                                     
11The monopolist’s optimizing problem in our study resembles the monopolist’s optimizing problem in 
the literature on monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources. For the extraction of an 
exhaustible resource, the marginal cost of production may differ over time. Lewis (1976) and Stiglitz 
(1976) examine conditions for when the price path for a natural resource, produced by a monopoly, 
deviates from the optimal (competitive) price paths, and in which direction it deviates. However, in 
their analysis it is assumed that buyers do not have the possibilities to either bank or borrow. Hence, 
the monopolist is not restricted from letting the present value price increase over time.  
 
 
 
13
CICERO Working Paper 2004:11  
 Dominant agents and intertemporal emissions trading 
 
2
the case where the monopolist receives a sufficiently high amount of initial permits in period 
1 such that the non-borrowing constraint is not binding for the monopolist for a distribution of 
permit sale which gives 1p pδ= . If the demand for permits is more price sensitive in period 
1 than in period 2, that is if 1 2ε ε>  for 1 2p pδ= , the monopolist would have preferred to 
sell more permits in period 1 and less permits in period 2 which would result in 1 2p pδ< . 
However, because the fringe can bank permits, and thus the possibility for arbitrage, this 
could not be an equilibrium, and the monopolist is forced to not let  the price in period 1 be 
lower than the present value price in period 2. So in this case, the monopolist could not take 
advantage of the non-borrowing constraint faced by the fringe (see figure 3).  
 
Proposition 2. A constant present-value price over time does not imply a cost- effective 
distribution of abatement (permit sales) across periods. 
 
Proof: It follows directly from the second part of the proof for proposition 1. 
           □ 
One might think that a constant present-value price over time is consistent with a cost-
effective distribution of sales across periods, and hence that a non-borrowing constraint does 
not influence the outcome in this case. However, we may observe identical present-value 
prices of permits over time, although a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods 
would be consistent with a positive shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint, and hence a 
decrease in the present-value price of permits over time. This implies that although the costs 
of the fringe are minimized when the present-value price of permits is constant over time, the 
monopolist would manipulate the distribution of emissions across periods by selling more of 
the permits in period 1 to increase its profit. This is the case when the marginal revenue of 
permit sales is higher in period 1 than in period 2 for a cost-effective distribution of sales 
across periods (i.e where 1 2p pδ> ). As long as the increase in income from permit sales 
gained by transferring sales from period 2 to period 1 is higher than the increase in the 
monopolist’s total abatement cost by such a transfer, the monopolist will benefit from the 
transfer of sale. For , the monopolist cannot increase its income from permit sales by 
additional transfer of permit sales from period 2 to period 1, since 
%
1 1Fq q>
1 2p pδ=  for , 
and the solution to the profit maximizing problem for the monopolist is 
(described in figure 3). Compared to a cost-effective distribution of 
abatement across periods, the monopolist’s market power in the permit market has led to a 
situation where the difference in the present value of the marginal abatement cost over time 
has increased for the monopolist and decreased for the fringe such that eq. (9) is not satisfied.  
%
1 1Fq q>
% *
11Fq q q< ≤ %1M
3 The impact of initial distribution of permits over time   
As we established in proposition 1, the intertemporal cost effectiveness condition (9) is 
generally not satisfied when the non-borrowing constraint is binding for any of the agents in 
equilibrium. In the following section we analyze how the initial distribution of permits across 
periods affects the intertemporal cost effectiveness, and whether it is possible, through a 
proper intertemporal distribution of permits, to achieve intertemporal cost effectiveness, i.e. 
fulfill equation (9). We consider a redistribution of permits across agents and across time, 
which leaves the target for total emissions in each period and the total endowments of permits 
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0
2 j M
)
over both periods for each agent unchanged. This implies that the first period emission 
constraint, given by (7), and the total emission constraint, given by (6) are unchanged.  
Let the total initial allocation of permits to each of the agents over both periods be a 
constant, denoted , j = F,M , and the total allocation of permits for each period is a 
constant, denoted , i =1,2.  Then we must have  and . We 
can write the initial allocation of permits for each agent in each period as a function of the 
initial allocation of permits to the monopolist in period 1, that is . We first consider 
the impact of the distribution of permits across periods when we have an interior solution. 
0
jQ
0
iQ
0 0
1j jQ Q Q= + 0 0 0i iF iQ Q Q= +
0 0
1(ij MQ Q
  
Proposition 3.  The total cost of the agreement can be reduced by giving the monopolist 
a lower share of the first period permits if  
1 2 1
* * * *
1 2 1 2
( ( )) ( (F F M
F F M
C C C C
e e e e
δ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − − > − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
2 ))M
M
δ in equilibrium, and a higher share of the 
first period permits if 1 2 1* * * *
1 2 1 2
( ( )) ( ( ))F F M
F F M
C C C C
e e e e
δ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − − < − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
2M
M
δ
0
1 )
, (given that the 
optimal solution is an interior solution).  
 
Proof: Since and , and and  are 
constants, we find that  
0 0
1 1F MQ Q Q+ = 0 0 01 2 ( ,j j jQ Q Q j F M+ = = 01Q 0jQ
* *
1 2
0 0
1 1
j j
M M
e e
Q Q
∂ ∂= −∂ ∂  and  
* *
1 1
0 0
1 1
1F M
M M
e e
Q Q
∂ ∂= −∂ ∂ =  when the non-borrowing 
constraints are binding. We find that  
*
1 2 1 2 1
0 * * * * 0
1 1 2 1 2 1
( ) ( )M M F F
M M M F F M
C C C C qTC
Q e e e e Q
δ δ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = − − − − − − − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ 1⎤⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎣ ⎦ ⎦  
where  is the solution to (32) and *1q
1 2
* *
1 2
( ) 0j j j
j j
C C
for
e e
δ λ 0∂ ∂− − − = =∂ ∂  
We find from total differentiation of (32) that 
*
1 2
* * *
1 1 2
0
1M
p p qA
q q q
Q A
2
*
1q
∂ ∂ ∂− + − ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂=∂ − , 
where A is the expression for the second-order condition for profit maximization and will be 
negative if the second-order sufficiency condition for maximum obtains. 12
It follows from (22) and (23) and the fact that 
*
2
*
1
q
q
∂
∂ = -1, that 
*
1
0
1
1
M
q
Q
∂ <∂ . 
           □ 
 
If the difference in the present value of marginal abatement cost over time is higher for the 
fringe than the monopolist, a redistribution of the endowment of permits which leads to 
                                                     
12 It follows from our assumption that the marginal revenue is decreasing in for all 1q 1 1Fq q≤ % , that the 
second-order sufficiency condition is satisfied  (see footnote 8).   
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higher emission from the fringe and lower (or equal) emission from the monopolist in period 
1, and vice versa in period 2, would reduce the cost of the agreement. As an example, 
consider the case where 1 2* *
1 2
( ) 0M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − =∂ ∂ and 
1 2
* *
1 2
( ) 0F F
F F
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − >∂ ∂  (this 
corresponds to the solution illustrated in figure 4).13 Thus, in this example the non-borrowing 
constraint is binding for the fringe, but not for the monopolist. Transferring permits from 
period 1 to period 2 for the monopolist, and vice versa for the fringe, would not influence the 
difference in marginal abatement costs across periods for the monopolist since the monopolist 
faces a non-binding non-borrowing constraint. However, this would reduce the difference in 
marginal abatement costs across periods for the fringe and hence reduce the fringe’s total 
abatement cost. This reduction in cost will be somewhat offset by a reduction in the 
monopolist’s optimal number of permit sold. But since we find that the reduction in permit 
sales, following from a decrease in allocation of initial permits in period 1, is less than 1, 
(
*
1
0
1
1
M
q
Q
∂ <∂ ), the net effect is a reduction in the fringe’s total abatement costs. On the other 
hand, if  1 2* *
1 2
( )M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − >∂ ∂ 0
2
, the opposite would be the case.  
 
Proposition 4.  As long as the solution to the monopolist’s optimization problem is the 
corner solution (characterized by the solution no. 3. in section 2.2.2), a marginal 
redistribution of first-period emission permits between the agents has no effect on the 
total cost. 
 
Proof: 
Let  be the solution which ensures*1q 1p pδ= . We find that (see proof for proposition 4.): 
*
1 2 1 2 1
0 * * * * 0
1 1 2 1 2 1
( ) ( )M M F F
M M M F F M
C C C C qTC
Q e e e e Q
δ δ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ = − − − − − − − ⋅ −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ 1⎤⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣⎣ ⎦ ⎦
2
 
As long as the abatement cost function of the fringe and the monopolist is such that it is 
optimal for the monopolist to let 1p pδ= ,although this implies that 
1 2
* *
1 2
( )M M
M M
C C
e e
δ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂− − − >⎜ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ 0⎟  >0, we find the expression for 
*
1
0
1M
q
Q
∂
∂ by differentiation of the 
optimal condition 1 2p pδ= .  From (22) and (23)  we see that  
 
2 2
1 2
* * 2 * 2
1 1 2
2 20
1 21
* 2 * 2
1 2
( ) ( ) 1
( ) ( )
F F
F F
F FM
F F
C C
q e e
C CQ
e e
∂ ∂+∂ ∂ ∂= =∂ ∂∂ +∂ ∂
. This means that 0
1M
TC
Q
∂
∂ = 0.  
                                                               
□ 
13 Note that changes in 0
1M
Q would both affect the marginal profit function and the level of 1Fq%  and 
1Mq% .  
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Giving a higher share of the first-period permits to the monopolist only leads to a 
corresponding higher sale of permits. And the distribution of emissions across agents and 
periods would be the same.   
However, the redistribution of permits leads to a lower marginal profit from permit sales, 
which implies that for a sufficiently high redistribution of permits, the solution to the 
monopolist’s profit maximizing problem could change from a corner solution to an interior 
solution (given by (32) ).  This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5.  A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved 
by an appropriate distribution of first-period emission permits between the agents. 
 
Proof: If the monopolist has chosen to distribute permit sale such that (32) (interior solution) 
is satisfied, we see from the proof of proposition 2 that total cost can be reduced by changes 
in 01MQ , as long as 1 2 1* * * *
1 2 1 2
( ( )) ( (F F M
F F M
C C C C
e e e e
δ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− − − ≠ − − −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
2 ))M
M
δ . We see from the first-
order condition (32), that intertemporal cost efficiency is achieved for the distribution of 
initial permits, which ensures that * * *1 21 2 2* *
1 2
M
p pq q where q Q
q q
δ∂ ∂ *1q⋅ = ⋅ = −∂ ∂  .  
If the monopolist’s optimization problem leads to a corner solution, we still find that   
2 * 0 2 * 2 *
1 1 1 1 1
* 0 * 0 * * 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
* *
1 2
( , ( ) ( , ) ( , )
0
M M M M
*
M M M
Q q Q Q q Q q q
q Q q Q q q Q
p p
q q
δ
∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂= + ⋅∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂= + ⋅ <∂ ∂
   
            
This means that the marginal income from selling the last unit of permits is lower, the 
higher 01MQ . A sufficiently large
0
1MQ , and hence low , will make the marginal profit from 
selling the last unit of permits in the corner solution equal to zero. An additional increase in 
0
1FQ
0
1MQ  from that point will make it optimal for the monopolist to choose an interior solution. 
Hence, a sufficiently large transfer of initial first-period permits from the fringe to the 
monopolist would move the optimal solution for permit sales from a corner solution (as in 
figure 4) to an interior solution (as in figure 1.), where a cost-effective distribution of 
abatement across periods is achieved for a distribution of permits to the monopolist that 
ensures that (34) is satisfied.  
           □ 
4 The impact of changes in market structure over time  
In the previous section we discussed how the initial distribution of permits across agents 
influences cost-effectiveness when one of the agents has market power. We assumed that one 
of the agents (the monopolist) is a larger seller of the total number of permits sold on the 
market. However, the structure of the permit trading system may change over time and 
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include more emitters in future periods than in the first period.14 We may face a situation 
where we initially have few emitters included in the permit trading system,  while inclusion of 
more emitters over time expands the market for emission trading in the future. The 
monopolist in our model may hence face a situation where it has a lot of permits to sell in the 
first period, but this amount is relatively low compared to the expected total sale of permits in 
the second period. The question we ask is how the restrictions on intertemporal trading 
influence the dominant agent’s opportunity to exploit its market power when there is a change 
in market structure over time.  
From the analyses in the previous sections, we derive the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 6: Assume a dominant agent in the first period and a competitive market in 
the second period. If there are no restrictions on banking or borrowing, this will 
undermine the ability of the first-period dominant agent to exploit its market power.  
 
 If the agents have perfect foresight, the dominant agent cannot charge a higher (present 
value) price in period 1 than the competitive second period price. If the agent with a dominant 
position in the first period is too small to have a dominant position in the total market for 
permits over both periods, the agent cannot influence the price of permits. The competitive 
outcome is realized, and marginal abatement costs are equalized across agents and across 
periods, which implies cost-effectiveness. 
However, the introduction of a restriction on borrowing gives a dominant agent in the first 
period the opportunity to take advantage of its dominant position in the first period.  
 
Proposition 7: If there is a restriction on borrowing, a dominant agent in the first period 
and a competitive market in the second period, then the monopolist will exploit its 
market power in the first period as long as . The price in the first period would 
exceed the competitive price in the second period.  
1 0q >
 
Proof: 
In a competitive second period market, the monopolist cannot influence the second period 
price, that is 2
2
0p
q
∂ =∂ . We first show that 1 2p pδ= ⋅ is not a possible equilibrium.  
The marginal profit of selling  when the monopolist minimizes its abatement cost and 1q
2
2
0p
q
∂ =∂  is given by  
1 1 1
1 1 2
1 1 1
( , ) 2
2
M M M
M M
Q q p C Cp q p
q q e
δ δ⎡ ⎤∂Π ∂ ∂ ∂= + ⋅ − ⋅ + − ⋅⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ e∂
                                                     
.   (35) 
14 For instance in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the dominant agent’s (Russia’s) position in the permit 
market might change in the future if, for instance, developing countries participate in the permit trading 
system. Also, within other permit trading systems, choosing to include more industries in trading of 
emission permits might make the market more competitive.  
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2
We see from the description of the possible solutions 1 - 3 in section 2.2.2 that 
1p pδ= ⋅ in equilibrium implies that eq. (35) must be non-negative for 1 2p pδ= ⋅ . (Positive 
for the corner solution characterized by 3, and zero for the solutions characterized by 1 and 2 
in section 2.2.2). However if eq. (35) is non-negative for 1 2p pδ= ⋅ , we must have that 
1 2
* *
1 2
( )M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − ⋅ <∂ ∂ 0 , since 
1
1
1
0p q
q
∂ ⋅ <∂ , which contradicts (27)and (28) . This means 
1 2p pδ> ⋅  and we can rule out the optimal solutions characterizes by 2 and 3 as possible 
equilibriums. The solution to the monopolist optimizing problem is given by (32). The 
optimal condition (32), when  2
2
0p
q
∂ =∂  is given by  
1 2 1
1 1 2
1 2 1
( )M M
M M
C C pp q p
e e q
δ δ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂− − − ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ 0  
 
It follows from the fact that  1 2* *
1 2
( )M M
M M
C C
e e
δ∂ ∂− − − ⋅ ≥∂ ∂ 0  and  
1
1
1
0p q
q
∂ ⋅ <∂ , that the 
intertemporal cost effectiveness condition (Equation (9))  never will  be satisfied for .  1 0q >
           □ 
 
When the monopolist faces a competitive market in future periods, the income from each 
permit sold in period 2 will not decline in quantity sold. Hence transferring permit sales from 
period 1 to period 2 does not reduce the income per unit sold in period 2.  (This is opposed to 
the situation where the monopolist had market power in both markets. In that case, increased 
permit sales in period 2 led to a lower price in period 2.) Restricting permit sales in period 1 
in order to increase the permit price has hence no alternative cost in terms of a reduction in 
prices in period 2. Hence it will always be optimal for a monopolist to restrict sales in period 
1 and increase sales correspondingly in period 2, such that the 1 2p pδ> ⋅ .  
Hence, with a dominant agent in the first period and a competitive permit market in the 
second, restricting intertemporal trading to banking results in a dominant agent in period 1 
getting the opportunity to exploit its market power. This is opposed to the situation with full 
intertemporal trading where the market power of the dominant agent would always be 
undermined. 
 
5 Total cost effects 
So far we have only considered the intertemporal inefficiency of prohibiting borrowing when 
the monopolist’s  total sale of permits ( 1Q ) is given, when there is a non–borrowing 
constraint. To obtain the effects on total costs of prohibiting borrowing we also have to 
consider how total permit sale is affected as result of the possibility for the monopolist’s 
possibility to price discriminate between periods.  
The effect on total cost of introducing a non-borrowing constraint can be divided in three. 
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First, introducing a non-borrowing constraint may have a negative impact on the total cost 
of reaching a specific target for total emissions over both periods, even if there is no agent 
exerting market power. This is the case if the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint 
becomes positive (see eq.(10)). Second, as we have derived in section 2.2.2, the monopolist 
can take advantage of the possibility of manipulating the price difference between periods 
such that intertemporal cost effectiveness, given the non-borrowing constraint, is not satisfied. 
(Equation (9) is not satisfied). As we have seen in section 3, this manipulation increases the 
total cost of reaching the target. Third, the opportunity for manipulating the price difference 
across periods may also result in another optimal total sale over both periods compared to the 
optimal solution under full intertemporal trading.  
Since the focus of this paper is on how a dominant firm takes advantage of a non-
borrowing constraint, we ignore in the following the first effect by considering a situation 
where the monopolist can choose to what extent total permit sales could be distributed across 
periods such that the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint would be zero for all 
agents. Hence, we consider a situation described in figure 2 for all possible choices of Q .  As 
discussed above, the monopolist can manipulate the price difference over time and cause an 
intertemporal inefficiency, but this possibility of manipulation may also lead to higher or 
lower total permit sales, Q . Hence, the increase in total cost of introducing this non-
borrowing constraint not only depends on the impact of how the monopolist distributes permit 
sales across periods, but also on the impact on the total sale of permits. Obviously, if the 
monopolist’s ability to charge different prices over time also makes it optimal for the 
monopolist to increase its total sale of permits, the increased sales could offset the 
inefficiency from a non-optimal distribution of emissions across periods. If total sales do not 
increase, the implication of introducing a non-borrowing constraint is that the total cost of the 
agreement increases, whenever the shadow cost of the non-borrowing constraint differs across 
agents.15 Whether the opportunity to price discriminate leads to a greater or lesser sale of 
permits depends on the curvature of the demand functions for permits over time. This is 
formally analyzed in Schmalensee (1981) and in Varian (1985). Schmalensee (op.cit.) shows 
that the total output would decline (increase) under price discrimination compared to a 
situation without price discrimination with specific conditions for the demand curves. A 
declining (increasing) total output would be the case if all the markets with price 
discrimination that have  prices higher than the price without price discrimination (p*) have 
concave (convex) demand curves, while all markets with prices less than p* have linear 
demand curves.  If all demand curves are either convex or concave we cannot in general say 
whether output will raise or fall. Further, Robinson (1933) shows that if a monopolist that 
sells in two markets is allowed to discriminate between them, total output is unchanged if 
both markets have linear demand curves. 
In our case, this implies that we obtain a clear result for the effect on total costs of 
prohibiting borrowing when this leads to an ineffective distribution of permits across periods 
and when total permit sales decrease because of price discrimination between periods. Hence: 
 
Proposition 8:  If we observe 1 2p pδ> , introducing a non-borrowing constraint (which 
is not binding with a cost-effective distribution of permit sales across periods), will 
increase total costs if: 
- the demand for permits in period 1 is concave, while the demand for permits in 
period 2 is linear, or  
- the demand for permits in both periods is linear.  
                                                     
15 Schmalensee (1981) shows that an increase in output is a necessary condition for welfare to increase 
under third-degree price discriminations. 
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However, if this is not the case, the effects on total costs of prohibiting borrowing would 
be unclear, when we observe 1 2p pδ> . 
 
Obviously, total cost would be unchanged if the monopolist finds it optimal to let 
1 2p pδ=  (if the constraint on borrowing is non-binding with a cost-effective distribution of 
permits across periods).  
6 Discussion 
Several studies have underlined the opportunities for exercising of market power in the permit 
market. Hahn (1984) is the first to explore this issue, but a lot of others have followed, such as 
Westskog (1996), Bernstein et al (1999) and Böhringer (2002). All of this literature analyzes 
the consequences of agents exercising market power in one period, and does not take into 
account how future permit-market developments influence the ability of a dominant agent to 
explore its market power. Further, none of these studies analyzes the consequences for the 
permit price of having a binding restriction on borrowing. Our study shows that their 
conclusions regarding the permit price for instance under the Kyoto Protocol need to be 
reexamined. We have shown that even if a restriction on borrowing would not have efficiency 
consequences in a competitive market of permits, i.e. be non-binding for the agents, a 
dominant agent might take advantage of this restriction to increase its market power, and we 
may face a higher permit price in the first period than otherwise expected. Further, we have 
shown that a constant present-value price of permits could still imply that the monopolist had 
taken advantage of the non-borrowing constraint, i.e. that a constant present value price of 
permits does not necessarily imply a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods.   
However, we have also pointed out that the regulator can influence total abatement costs 
through distribution of permits over time even under a constraint on equity. A cost-effective 
distribution of abatement across periods could be obtained by an appropriate distribution of 
each agent’s total endowment of permits over time. Hence, the regulator could take equity 
considerations into account at the same time as achieving a cost-effective outcome. 
Finally, we have shown that the market structure in the future might influence the ability of 
a dominant agent to explore its market power. If we face a competitive permit market in 
future periods, but have a dominant agent in the first period without a binding restriction on 
borrowing, the ability of a dominant agent to explore its market power might be undermined 
in that period, and the permit price might be lower than otherwise expected. 
A relevant example of the problem addressed here would be the allocation of permits to 
Russia under the Kyoto Protocol. Here, Russia has been allocated a very large amount of 
permits in the first period, and only banking of emission permits is allowed under the 
Protocol. Russia might take advantage of this to increase its market power by selling so few 
permits that the restriction on borrowing becomes binding for the purchasing agents. This 
would be possible even if a competitive market is expected in the next commitment period, 
and the permit price would be higher than otherwise expected. 
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